Strategic Defence Review 2024: Call for Evidence

These recommendations were submitted on Sept 30th, 2024, and as such may refer to policies and projects that have since been updated, re-scoped or decommissioned. For our most up-to-date research, please go here.

The UK faces an evolving landscape of biological threats that demand urgent attention from defence planners. From Russia’s dangerous rhetoric around biological weapons to the acceleration of zoonotic disease emergence due to climate change, the window for strengthening our biological defence capabilities is narrowing. The COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrated that the UK was not as well prepared for a pandemic as previously thought – a lesson that must inform our approach to future biological risks.

As an independent think tank with expertise in biological security, we submitted detailed recommendations to the Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Defence Review 2024, focused on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats expected to evolve through 2050.

Key Recommendations

Our submission recommended the UK prioritise:

• Early Detection and Warning Systems – Real-time biosurveillance capabilities, including the National Biosurveillance Network, that can identify emerging pathogens and unknown threats to provide early warning to UK personnel.
• Microbial Forensics Capability – A sovereign national capability to conduct forensic examinations supporting attribution of biological threats, essential for deterring hostile actors through accountability.
• Cross-Government Risk Coordination – Improved biosecurity coordination across government departments, addressing the coordination deficits revealed during the COVID-19 response. The Ministry of Defence has already taken leadership roles, becoming the lead department for the DETECT Pillar within the UK Biological Security Strategy and taking direct responsibility for strengthening national microbial forensics capability. However, our independent progress review found that critical initiatives like the National Biosurveillance Network have suffered from underspending and delays.
• International Leadership Opportunities – As a founding NATO member, the UK should play an expanded role in leading NATO’s counter-CBRN strategy. The UK is especially well-placed to lead NATO’s biotechnology initiatives, leveraging world-class expertise to help the alliance maximise benefits from emerging technologies while growing the UK’s own bioeconomy. Enhanced engagement with the Five Eyes partners, particularly strengthening US-UK collaboration on biological defence and security, will be crucial for improved, integrated biosurveillance capabilities and novel pathogen detection and attribution.
• Capability audits – A capability audit should assess vulnerabilities in current counter-CBRN programmes to ensure they remain appropriately funded and resourced against evolving threats. As the MoD’s Science & Technology strategy notes: “Sustained investment in chemical and biological capability has been critical in UK operations both at home and overseas.”

These recommendations complement the UK’s 2023 biological security and economic strategies, aiming to help the Government achieve both national security and prosperity goals through decisive, future-focused enhancement of biological defence capabilities.