Exercise Pegasus represents meaningful progress. It’s the UK’s most ambitious pandemic preparedness test since COVID-19, with impressive scope: all government departments, devolved administrations, 38 Local Resilience Forums, and ministerial participation.[1][5]
Our goal at CLTR is simple: the UK should have best-in-class exercising as part of its pandemic preparedness toolkit. Exercises should produce lasting change, embedding learnings into the architecture of the UK’s pandemic preparedness and building the “flex” needed to scale for extreme biological risks.
Here’s what we’ll be looking for from Exercise Pegasus to demonstrate the UK is operating at that level.
1. Test-trace-isolate systems exercised as operational capabilities
Pre-COVID exercises assumed containment was impossible, creating a catastrophic blind spot: no UK exercise had tested test-trace-isolate infrastructure.[1] Exercising decision-making without operational systems would repeat this failure. We want to see “capabilities-based” exercises that test actual response capacities.[3]
We’ll be looking for evidence that Exercise Pegasus stress-tested contact tracing capacity under surge demand, simulated the decision point for abandoning community tracing (as occurred 12 March 2020), and tested quarantine logistics and isolation support systems, not just discussed them. To tackle extreme risks, these systems must be modular and ready to scale rapidly beyond “standard” pandemic levels.
2. Published findings by February 2026, action plan by May 2026
The COVID-19 Inquiry’s Recommendation 7 specifies exact timelines: exercise reports within three months of conclusion, action plans within six months.[1] These timelines exist because delayed reporting enables institutional forgetfulness and dilutes accountability. Exercise Cygnus concluded in October 2016; its report remained classified until October 2020, released only after a judicial review challenge.[4]
Exercise Pegasus’s live phases concluded 5 November 2025. Whilst the government has committed to publishing findings, it stated this “may take up to 12 months”[5], double the Inquiry’s recommendation. Best practice requires a public report by February 2026 and a detailed action plan by May 2026, we would be excited to see this deadline met.
3. Named ownership for every recommendation with quarterly tracking
The single most consistent finding across international research is that exercises fail not in identifying problems, but in implementing solutions. As one systematic review concluded: “While identifying lessons is relatively straightforward, true learning is much harder. Anecdotal evidence suggests mistakes are repeated incident after incident.”[6]
We want to see recommendations and actions linked to named responsible individuals (not departments), allocated resources, given completion dates, providing quarterly progress reviews to senior leadership, and including success verification mechanisms. The COVID-19 Inquiry found that historically, Public Health England “ran the exercises but were not responsible for implementing their recommendations.”[1] Without explicit ownership assignment, Exercise Pegasus risks the same accountability vacuum. The government’s new Lessons Management Best Practice Guidance (2024) and the Amber Book’s lessons management framework provide the structure, but the real test is rigorous application.[7][13]
4. 2026 recovery phase designed to verify previous lessons were embedded
Exercise Pegasus’s first objective states it will test “how relevant priority lessons from previous exercises have been embedded”[9]. This is an important design innovation. We’re watching for evaluation methodology that credibly assesses embedding, evidence that findings are actioned when embedding proves incomplete, and explicit testing in the 2026 recovery phase to verify long-term institutionalisation.
5. Evidence of cross-cutting capabilities across the machinery of government
The COVID-19 Inquiry highlighted how the UK’s response was often slowed by a “lead department” model that struggled to coordinate across the wider machinery of government.[1] To address this, the Amber Book and the Exercising Best Practice Guidance (2024) emphasise a shift toward “integrated resilience”, reflecting the idea that no single department can manage a high-consequence risk in isolation.[11][13] We will be looking for evidence that Exercise Pegasus successfully moved beyond a health-centric silo to test how the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health and Social Care function as a unified team.
This cross-cutting coordination is a critical capability for scaling a response to extreme biological events. A gold-standard exercise should demonstrate that these national structures are properly synchronised with Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) and the Devolved Administrations. To be truly cohesive, the exercise must show that local insights were treated as a primary data source for national decision-making, rather than a secondary consideration.
6. Equity impacts actively tested in decision-making, not treated as an afterthought
COVID-19 killed disproportionately across deprivation, ethnicity, care settings, and disability. The Inquiry found “pre-existing health inequalities were not taken into account in planning.”[1] Sadly, Exercise Alice has identified care home vulnerabilities but never shared them with the sector.[2]
Exercise Pegasus should therefore simulate decision-making about shielding and support mechanisms; include representatives from social care, disability organisations, and communities disproportionately affected by COVID-19; and evaluate whether equity considerations genuinely influenced exercise decisions or were treated as a secondary concern.
7. Ensure proper observation and evaluation as per the Cabinet Office’s Exercising Best Practice Guidance
The Inquiry identified “groupthink” as a systemic failure, citing unchallenged assumptions and optimism bias as evidence.[1] To counter this, the UK’s Exercising Best Practice Guidance (2024) and the Amber Book emphasise a rigorous, multi-layered approach to assessment.[11][13] A gold standard exercise must clearly distinguish between three distinct functions: independent observers (to provide a “cold-eye” view of how processes are followed), independent evaluators (to objectively measure performance against specific objectives), and red teams (to actively challenge assumptions and probe for failure points, as per the Inquiry’s Recommendation 9).[1]
We’ll be looking for transparency about how these functions were utilised; specifically, whether external evaluators were given the latitude to stress-test ministerial decision-making and the realism of the scenario. We want to see evidence that their insights were given equal weight to internal assessments – this might look like transparency over which challenges the Red Teams raise, and how they were responded to. This tiered approach ensures that Exercise Pegasus serves as a genuine stress-test for extreme risks, moving the needle from validating existing plans to identifying necessary systemic improvements.
8. Recovery phase tests multi-year resilience, not just acute response
Pre-COVID exercises simulated days or weeks. COVID-19 demonstrated pandemics extend across years with multiple waves and compounding consequences. The Inquiry’s Recommendation 6 requires testing “response at all stages from initial outbreak to multiple waves over several years.”[1] The Amber Book distinguishes between acute and enduring phases of crises (emergence, containment, mitigation and recovery) and suggests these phases require different governance structures and testing.[13]
The 2026 recovery phase will be particularly revealing for us: Does it test NHS backlog management, long-term health consequences, economic support withdrawal, and sustained surveillance? Does it receive equivalent rigour to acute response? Is decision-making fatigue and resource depletion realistically simulated? What are the priorities identified for restoring national recovery?
9. Communication tested under hostile conditions, not discussion settings
Exercise Pegasus’s sixth objective tests “strategic response to disinformation”[9] which is essential. But we would like to see capabilities tested under pressure, not simply discussed in seminar format.
Exercise Cygnus and Event 201 modelled best practice here, and we want to see evidence of:[4][12] simulated media briefings with hostile questioning, real-time social media monitoring and response, coordination between national and local messaging, testing of rumour surveillance and rapid rebuttal systems and simulation of scientific uncertainty communication.
Event 201 even used pre-recorded news broadcasts and simulated social media to create psychological pressure.[12] The test for Exercise Pegasus is whether communication was tested under realistic adversarial conditions, or treated as a discussion topic rather than a capability to be stress-tested.
10. Ministers made actual resource allocation decisions under time pressure
The COVID-19 Inquiry found coordination failures between UK Government and devolved administrations, between departments, and between national and local tiers.[1] Exercise Pegasus has involved “every Government Department, the devolved governments, representation from arm’s length bodies” with ministerial participation.[5]
We want to see evidence of: COBR activation with realistic time pressures, ministers participating and making actual decisions (not just observing), testing of information flows between tiers, simulation of inter-governmental disagreements, and realistic resource allocation decisions with trade-offs. Alongside this, we would like information to be available regarding how many ministers were involved, their seniority, and across which departments.
It is vital that coordination mechanisms are stress-tested to failure points, rather than being confirmed to work under benign conditions.
Conclusion
The implementation gap is where exercises fail. Taiwan and South Korea performed dramatically better during COVID-19 because they implemented lessons from SARS and MERS; restructuring institutions, allocating resources effectively and embedding changes in law.[8] The UK ran exercises and filed reports that went largely unseen.
We are excited to see that Exercise Pegasus has promising features: explicit Inquiry alignment, inequalities as core objective, four-nations scope, transparency commitments. However, the gap between “lessons identified” and “lessons learned” is where every UK pandemic exercise has failed. Exercise Pegasus can be different, but only if evaluation is rigorous, timelines are honoured, accountability is explicit, and progress implementation is tracked relentlessly. Exercise Pegasus needs to generate real change – pandemics don’t grade on effort.
References
[1] UK Covid-19 Inquiry. Module 1: The Resilience and Preparedness of the United Kingdom. HC 18. 18 July 2024.
[2] Public Health England. Report – Exercise Alice. 15 February 2016. Inquiry Ref: INQ000022732_0016.
[3] FEMA. Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). February 2020.
[4] Public Health England. Exercise Cygnus Report: Tier One Command Post Exercise Pandemic Influenza 18 to 20 October 2016. 13 July 2017. Published 20 October 2020.
[5] Dalton, Ashley. “Pandemic Preparedness – Update on Exercise PEGASUS.” HCWS1015. 4 November 2025.
[6] Reddin, K, Bang, H, and Miles, L. “Evaluating Simulations as Preparation for Health Crises like COVID-19: Insights on Incorporating Simulation Exercises for Effective Response.” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 59 (2021): 102245.
[7] Cabinet Office. Lessons Management Best Practice Guidance. September 2024.
[8] Sell, TK, Watson, CR, Mullen, L, Shearer, MP, and Toner, ES. “Pandemic Exercises: Lessons for a New Era in Pandemic Preparedness.” Health Security 23(1) (2025): 62-69.
[9] Marsh, Sarah-Jane. “Pandemic Preparedness & Exercise Pegasus.” NHS England Board Paper BM/25/28(Pu). 16 July 2025.
[10] UK Government. “UK Government UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response – Module 1 Implementation Update.” 17 January 2025.
[11] Cabinet Office. Exercising Best Practice Guidance. September 2024.
[12] Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, World Economic Forum, and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. “Event 201: A Global Pandemic Exercise.” 18 October 2019.
[13] Cabinet Office. The Amber Book: Managing Crisis in Central Government. Version 3. London: Crown Copyright, April 2025.
