The highly anticipated UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was released earlier this week and CLTR were pleased to submit to the SDR call for evidence in Autumn 2024. CLTR welcomes the renewed recognition that biological threats demand the same strategic attention as conventional warfare. There are a number of key areas in the SDR that stand out as significant to biological defence and national security.
Here we share some relevant quotes and immediate ‘hot-take’ reflections. Over the summer, we’ll be thoroughly digesting the full document alongside other key releases, including the Spending Review, Defence Industrial Strategy, and the forthcoming Defence Investment Plan.
Engineering Biology (EngBio) is rightly recognised as one of the technologies redefining warfare:
“EngBio creates the potential to enhance the capacity of the armed forces through advances in medicine, healthcare, and wellbeing, possibilities for new energetic and explosive materials, as well as avenues for enormous harm in the shape of new pathogens and other weapons of mass destruction”. The signal is clear that EngBio has a key role to play in transforming UK Defence with new capabilities enhancing the capacity of the Armed Forces. However, it is also acknowledged that this same technology creates avenues for enormous harm: EngBio enables the development of novel pathogens and other weapons of mass destruction, presenting unprecedented biosecurity challenges. As the UK harnesses EngBio’s defensive potential, we must equally prioritise countering the severe threats that emerge from this dual-use technology.
MOD must work with – and beyond – the wider Government to build national preparedness and resilience:
To ensure the UK can withstand attacks and recover quickly. The MOD should seek to build the relationship with, and better utilise, the intellectual base outside Government to support long-term adaptation in deterrence and defence policy. This means working more closely with industry, think tanks, and academia to ensure a thriving network of expertise and debate. At CLTR, we recognise that biological threats require coordinated responses and look forward to engage with MOD and across sectors.
A whole-of-society approach to threats:
The review recognises the multiple current and potential future threats and challenges facing the UK and emphasises a “whole-of-society” approach to deterrence and defence – deepening civilian-military integration. The review rightly places Defence at the centre of deterrence to protect the nation. However, the shift in emphasis towards closer integration between Defence, the wider Government, and broader society is welcomed as a strategic, long-term approach.
MOD will provide a critical feed into a Cabinet Office led programme of exercises to test plans for response to an armed attack on the UK and/or NATO Allies:
In support of renewed national resilience, the review outlines that “The Cabinet Office-led Home Defence Programme will provide an additional layer of defence, security, and resilience planning, focused on alignment between military and civilian effort in a period of international hostilities affecting the UK.” It will be essential to unpack the details behind this and how the Home Defence Programme will connect with the country’s preparation for future bio-related threats, as well as its role, for example, in the context of the largest-ever UK pandemic response exercise, due to be held this Autumn. We also look forward to the publication of the National Security and Resilience Strategies to learn how the government is prioritising preparedness and resilience to extreme risks as part of defence and deterrence posture, as well as further outcomes of the resilience review in response to the Covid Inquiry’s findings (see our own recommendations here). You can also read our views on AI policy and incident preparedness here.
Institutional transformation is underway:
Alongside the recognition of EngBio as a transformative technology, the MOD is creating new technology-focused organisational structures, such as the new Defence Research and Evaluation (DRE) organisation. An “evolution of the current Dstl and Defence Science and Technology teams” that will “seed early-stage scientific research, harness commercial innovation and through the Chief Scientific Advisor, provide science policy guidance which MOD will draw upon to inform procurement decisions.” This new DRE will fall under another new structure, the National Armaments Directorate Group. Precisely how these new organisations will be governed and measured to deliver enhanced benefits over the existing team structures and functions remains unclear, and we will explore this space further later in the year.
Chemical and biological defence is rightly recognised as an essential and urgent activity:
“DRE’s internal research should robustly prioritise a small number of national security issues where sovereign ownership and skills are crucial, supported by partnership with one or two universities to develop external talent. The central dominant effort should be on: Chemical and biological defence. This is the essential and urgent activity.“
The list of dominant efforts also mentions the maintenance of unique testing capabilities, such as Porton Down laboratory. We fully welcome this prioritisation of chemical and biological defence in DRE activity and look forward to engaging with MOD to help ensure it properly resources, develops and delivers the right capabilities. Capabilities that augment or complement the UK’s Biological Security Strategy (such as the MOD-led UK Microbial Forensics Capability [UKMFC]), which deter the use of biological materials and protect the nation against biological threats, should be prioritised for funding.
Medical countermeasures renaissance:
“The MOD must work closely with the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) to ensure that the Defence Medical Services (DMS) and the NHS together have capacity to meet Defence medical needs, including in the most extreme circumstances. The two departments must conduct a sprint review of systemwide capacity and capability.” The SDR goes on to say that as part of rebuilding DMS and the wider enterprise in line with NATO’s Medical Action Plan, the MOD should: “Invest in medical evacuation and medical stockpiles at a scale that matches military commitments and deployments, as well as critical capabilities like counter-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment.”
This is exciting and welcome news to see the SDR set the direction and clear headmark for rebuilding defence medical countermeasure capabilities, including stockpiles. The explicit recognition that MOD will work directly with DHSC renews hope in generating modern medical countermeasure capabilities for wider society, one that should put UK manufacturing at its heart. For more CLTR insights, see our report on supply chains.
AI-Biology convergence opportunities:
Our final hot-take observation is that the SDR repeatedly draws out the importance of artificial intelligence (AI) to modernising defence and enhancing its effectiveness. Meanwhile, it also acknowledges that Artificial General Intelligence will have “profound implications for Defence” even while forecasts of its arrival are “uncertain but shortening.” We are keen to understand how Defence intends to integrate AI with Engineering Biology and what this means for practical MOD commitments to defensive acceleration in areas such as medical countermeasures development, biological detection, and attribution capabilities. We will be exploring this further in the weeks to come. You can explore our thinking around AI-Bio integration for national security and resilience purposes in one of our earlier reports on the bioeconomy.
Why this matters beyond defence circles:
The “whole-of-society” approach explicitly recognises that biological threats don’t respect sectoral boundaries. COVID-19 was our warning shot – engineered biological weapons could be our existential test.
This isn’t just about military preparedness. It’s about national resilience in an era where new technologies and basic biological knowledge could be used to weaponise the next pandemic.
The economic opportunity is equally compelling, positioning the UK as the global leader in biological defence technologies, supporting the development of societal resilience.
What’s next:
The Spending Review, Defence Industrial Strategy, and Defence Investment Plan are all scheduled for release later this year. Together, they will be crucial in articulating a blueprint for action and investment, as well as the partnerships and pathways key to unlocking renewed UK biological threat deterrence and resilience – turning policy into protective capability. The SDR has set the direction for the coming years and seeks to establish the UK defence industrial base as a core driver of economic growth. Defence spending needs to match the commitments stated in the SDR. At CLTR we think this means breaking away from legacy disinvestments and instead uplifting the essential and urgent activities, such as Chemical and Biological Defence, with commensurate and essential uplifts in funding and resourcing.
The question isn’t whether biological threats will emerge – it’s whether we’ll be ready.
At CLTR, we’ll be analysing how these commitments can be translated into practical deterrence against biological threats that could surpass the impact of COVID-19.
Look out for our in-depth SDR-related biological defence analyses, including more AI and risk management-focused perspectives, later this Autumn!
Thank you to Frankie Di-Nozzi, Lydia Preston, and Eleanor Hevey for their support with editing this publication.
